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“A coordinated mix of polices  in the G20 targeted to increase the share of wages in GDP by 1%-
5% in the next 5 years and to raise public investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% 
of GDP in each country can create up to 5.84% more growth in G20 countries (compared to 
business as usual).”  
 
 
The share of wages in national income (GDP) has declined by around 10 percentage points in the 
G20 countries over the past three decades (Onaran and Galanis, 2012).2 As the propensity to spend 
of wage-earners is higher than that of profit–earners the decline in the wage share has contributed 
to the deficiency of demand in the global economy, and has been deterimental for growth and 
employment. Our findings show that a 1%-point overall decline in the wage share in the world 
leads to a decline in global GDP by 0.36%-points (Onaran and Galanis, 2012). Details of the 
findings are summarized in Appendix A below). However in the current context of deficient 
aggregate demand and significant output gaps the reverse is also true: - a 1%-point increase in the 
wage share at global level could lead to 0.36 % point increase in the rate of growth in global GDP. 
This shows that growth in the world economy on aggregate is “wage-led”. 
 
We set out in this paper the effects on growth of a policy scenario that begins to reverse the decline 
in the wage share and is supplemented by an increase public investment in social and physical 
infrastructure. Table 1 summarizes the effects of a coordinated mix of policies in the G20 targeted 
to increase the share of wages in GDP over the next 5 years by 1%-5% depending on the country 
and to raise public investment in social and physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in each country. 
The effects on individual G20 countries are shown as well as on the G20 as a whole. As explained 
in the Annex the impact of the increase in the wage share on growth varies in different countries 
according to the structure of their economies, notably their investment, and export and import 
shares. The proposed policy mix takes account of this by proposing differential increases in the 
wage share by groups of countries. It nevertheless shows that growth in all G20 economies is raised 
by a coordinated increase  in the wage share.  
 
Column A of Table 1, postulates increases in the share of wages in GDP of between one and five 
percentage point according to the country across the G20 over five years. Countries are subdivided 
                                                          
1 This policy brief has been prepared for L20 for the G20 meetings in 2014 and published at 
http://www.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/0F/17/document_news.phtml 
2 The wage share is defined as labour compensation, adjusted for the labour income of the self-employed, as a ratio of 
GDP For reference in  2013, the wage share was 65.8% in the EU, 60.7% in Australia (in 2012), 60.3% in the US, and 
39.04% in Turkey according to data supplied by the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco). 
into three groups, starting with countries where growth is predominantly wage-led including the 
Euro-area, the UK, the US, Japan, Turkey and Korea. Increasing the share of wages in GDP by 
5% point in these countries could result in a wage-led recovery offsetting any negative effects on 
net exports or private investment as the current characteristics of the economies indicate strong 
internal demand effects (the details of these estimations are summarized in Appendix A below). 
The second group includes Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and India, where the wage share could be 
increased by 3% of GDP. While growth in these countries when they are treated in isolation is 
profit-led, a simultaneous increase in the wage share in the G20 (even at an equivalent amount in 
all countries) would lead to higher growth in these countries, as well. Finally, in the third group, a 
modest increase in the wage share by 1% of GDP in China, South Africa, and Australia can be 
pursued as part of a coordinated policy package. In this last group, the effect of a rise in the wage 
share would have an impact on net exports, which at first sight would limit the policy space for 
wage increases. However, part of the  policy mix is to raise public investment that in the short term 
would stimulate growth and in the medium term would lead to a rebalancing of these economies, 
making them less reliant on export demand, changing the structure of their exports towards less 
labour intensive goods as well as goods with a lower price elasticity of demand in the medium 
term. This would help develop a more diversified economic structure, and thereby for potential for 
higher increases in living standards in the future.  
 
Column B shows that in a scenario of coordinated wage-led recovery, all countries can increase 
their growth and overall this wage-led recovery could create 1.96% more growth in the G20 as 
a whole over the next five years. Thus a coordinated wage increase alone could  almost achieve 
the target of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to raise G20 GDP “by more 
than 2% above the trajectory implied by current policies over the coming five years”3. The effect 
of a coordinated public investment stimulus, i.e. increasing the ratio of public investment in 
physical and social infrastructure to GDP by 1% in each country is simulated under different 
assumptions about the size of multipliers. Column C includes the country specific multipliers 
identified in Onaran and Galanis (2012). Column D shows the growth effects in each country and 
overall G20 as an outcome of a coordinated (simultaneous) increase in public investment by 1% 
of GDP. The growth effects of a simultaneous public investment stimulus are significantly higher 
than those of an isolated stimulus in one single country, since the former involves cross-country 
interactions, i.e. international demand spill-overs. Column E shows the growth effects, if the 
multiplier is assumed to be 1.22 in all countries. This multiplier value is based on the mean of a 
large sample of multiplier values for public investment (based on the literature, which has been 
reviewed by Gechert (2013)4). Finally, columns F and G show growth effects under the assumption 
of a high value multiplier, 1.8, and a low value multiplier, 0.5, as used by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) regarding the values of capital spending multipliers. The overall 
                                                          
3 https://www.g20.org/australia_2014/finance_ministers_and_central_bank_governors_meeting 
4 Gechert (2013) reports the mean of 98 studies published between 1992 to 2013, providing a sample of 1882 
observations of multiplier values for public investment. 
results confirm that a public investment stimulus of 1% of GDP in each country can lead to 
1.94-3.88% higher growth in the G20 – compared to business as usual. Coming back to the initial 
goal to explore the effects of a policy mix, Columns H and K add the growth effects of this option 
under the assumption of different multipliers.  
 
The results show that a policy mix of coordinated wage increases and public investment stimulus 
can lead to higher growth in the G20 by  
 
 3.9% under the assumption of the lowest multiplier of 0.5. 
 4.4% under the assumption of a multiplier of 1.22. 
 5.5% under the assumption of a multiplier of 1.8. 
 5.8% under the assumption of our country specific multipliers (estimated in 
Onaran and Galanis, 2012). 
 
In summary, a policy mix of raising the wage share (e.g. through well set minimum wages and 
widening the coverage of collective bargaining) together with increased public investment in social 
and physical infrastructure would give a significant stimulus  to growth and hence employment 
over a five year period in G20 countries. This is in addition to help achieve the crucial objectives 
of reducing inequality, and achieving social, environmental, fiscal, and financial sustainability. 
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Table 1: Scenario of a wage-led recovery and public investment stimulus 
Increase in 
the wage 
share Growth
Multiplier 
Onaran and 
Galanis (2012) (3)
Growth with 
multiplier in 
Onaran and 
Galanis
Growth with 
Multiplier=1.22 
for all 
countries  (4)
Growth with 
Multiplier=1.8 
(5)
Growth with 
Multiplier=0.5 
(6)
Growth with 
multiplier in 
Onaran and 
Galanis
Growth with 
Multiplier=1.22 
for all countries  
(4)
Growth with 
Multiplier=1.8 (5)
Growth with 
Multiplier=0.5 (6)
A B C D E F G H=B+D I=B+E J=B+F K=B+G
Euro area (12 countries) 5 1.19 1.59 3.13 2.30 3.39 1.56 4.32 3.49 4.58 2.75
United Kingdom 5 1.06 1.20 2.37 2.04 3.01 1.18 3.43 3.10 4.06 2.24
United States 5 4.55 2.08 5.29 3.16 4.66 2.64 9.84 7.71 9.21 7.20
Japan 5 0.77 2.41 6.46 3.38 4.98 3.23 7.23 4.15 5.75 4.00
Canada 3 1.61 1.21 4.10 3.12 4.60 2.05 5.72 4.73 6.21 3.66
Australia 1 0.11 1.41 1.99 1.72 2.54 0.99 2.09 1.83 2.64 1.10
Turkey 5 3.42 2.21 4.87 2.69 3.97 2.44 8.30 6.11 7.39 5.86
Mexico 3 0.79 1.11 2.73 2.28 3.37 1.36 3.51 3.07 4.16 2.15
Korea 5 4.34 1.82 9.53 6.09 8.99 4.76 13.87 10.44 13.33 9.11
Argentina 3 0.68 1.38 3.34 2.58 3.81 1.67 4.03 3.26 4.49 2.36
China 1 2.01 1.23 6.06 4.33 6.39 3.03 8.07 6.34 8.40 5.04
India 3 0.13 2.18 4.75 2.66 3.92 2.38 4.89 2.79 4.06 2.51
South Africa 1 0.75 1.49 3.71 2.75 4.05 1.85 4.46 3.50 4.80 2.60
Growth in G20 (2) 1.96 3.88 2.42 3.57 1.94 5.84 4.38 5.53 3.90
Only wage led-recovery Coordinated public investment stimulus of 1% of GDP Policy mix: coordinated wage-led recovery+public investment of 1% of GDP
 
Notes 
1. Selected countries for which wage share data is available since 1970s. 
2. Weighted average of growth in each economy 
3. Onaran and Galanis (2012),  Is aggregate demand wage-led or profit-led? National and global effects, ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 
31, Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_192121.pdf 
4. The mean of 98 studies published between 1992 to 2013, providing a sample 
of 1882 observations of multiplier values for public investment, Source: Table 1 in Gechert, S. (2013). What fiscal policy is most effective? A Meta Regression 
Analysis. 
IMK working paper 117. 
5. The high value of capital spending multiplier reported in IMF 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/031909a.pdf 
6. The low value of capital spending multiplier reported in IMF 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/031909a.pdf 
Appendix: Empirical evidence for wage-led growth 
 
This section first summarises our most recent estimation results regarding the effects of the 
changes in the wage share on growth based on Onaran and Galanis (2012) for the major developed 
and developing G20 countries, for which there is data for the wage share since at least the 1970s. 
These countries constitute more than 80% of global GDP. In this work, we also go beyond the 
nation state as the unit of analysis and discuss the global effects based on the responses of each 
country to changes, not only in domestic income distribution, but also to trade partners’ wage 
shares. A change in the wage share of a trade partner affects the import prices and foreign demand 
for each country. This global interaction is significant, as pro-capital redistribution policies have 
been implemented almost simultaneously in many developed and developing countries in the post-
1980s period. Because of this, we have experienced a global “race to the bottom” in the wage 
share.   
The empirical analysis is based on econometric estimations of consumption, investment, 
exports, and imports. Consumption is estimated as a function of adjusted profits, and adjusted 
wages. Our findings show that the marginal propensity to consume out of profits is lower than that 
out of wages in all countries; thus, a rise in the profit share leads to a decline in consumption. 
Private investment is estimated as a function of output and the profit share. To estimate the effects 
of distribution on net exports, we follow a stepwise approach: Exports are estimated as a function 
of export/import prices, and the GDP of the rest of the world; imports as a function of domestic 
prices/import prices, and home country GDP; domestic prices and export prices, are estimated as 
functions of nominal unit labour costs and import prices. The total effect of a change in the wage 
share on exports encompasses the effects of nominal unit labour costs on prices, of prices on export 
prices, and of export prices on exports. The effect of a change in the wage share on GDP via 
international trade not only depends on the sensitivity of exports and imports to prices but also on 
the degree of openness of the economy (i.e., on the share of exports and imports in GDP); thus in 
relatively small open economies net exports may play a major role in determining the overall 
outcome; the effect becomes much lower in relatively closed large economies.  
The total effect of the decrease in the wage share on aggregate demand of the private sector 
(households and firms) depends on the overall impact on consumption, private investment and net 
exports of changes in functional income distribution. If the total effect is negative, the economy is 
termed “wage-led”; if the effect is positive, the regime is termed “profit-led”.  
Table A.1 summarises the effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on 
consumption, investment, and net exports based on the estimations by Onaran and Galanis (2012).  
One finding stands out for all countries: When the profit share increases the fall in domestic 
consumption outweighs the rise in private investment. Leaving exports and imports aside and 
looking at only the effects on domestic demand, i.e. the effects on consumption and investment (in 
columns A and B), the negative effect in absolute terms of the increase in the profit share on private 
consumption is substantially larger than the positive effect on private investment in all countries. 
This means that demand in the domestic sector of economies, leaving the foreign demand aside, is 
clearly wage-led.5 Hence, domestic demand unambiguously contracts when the wage share falls 
and the profit share increases. However, the effects on net exports in Column C have a crucial role 
in determining whether the economy is profit-led. Column D sets out the total effect on private 
demand. Column E shows the total effects after the multiplier process: The initial change in private 
demand due to a change in income distribution leads to a multiplier mechanism, which affects 
consumption, investment, and imports. This magnifies the effects of a change in income 
distribution on aggregate demand further. If the total effect in columns D and E is negative, then 
the economy is wage-led; thus, a rise in the profit share leads to a negative effect on growth.   
The Eurozone-12, the UK, the US, Japan, Turkey and Korea are wage-led economies. 
Overall, the results indicate that large, relatively closed economies are more likely to be wage-led. 
To illustrate, in the Eurozone-12 a 1%-point increase in the profit share leads to a 0.13% decrease 
in private demand. Germany, France, and Italy as individual large members of the Eurozone-12 
area are also wage-led. The absolute value of the effect of an increase in the profit share on demand 
in individual countries like Germany and France is smaller than in the Euro area as a whole, 
because the net export effects are higher for these countries as they have a much higher export and 
import share in GDP due to trade with the other European countries as well as non-European 
countries, whereas the Euro area as a whole is a rather closed economy with low extra-EU trade 
and high intra-EU trade. Previous studies show that small open economies in the Euro area, such 
as the Netherlands and Austria, may be profit-led, when analysed in isolation (Hein and Vogel 
2008; Stockhammer and Ederer, 2008).  A similar argument could apply to the rest of the EU. 
Thus, wage suppression, which keeps real wage growth below productivity and leads to a fall in 
the wage share in Europe as a whole is likely to have only moderate positive effects on trade 
balances, but it will have substantial negative effects on domestic demand.  If wages were to 
change simultaneously in all the EU countries, the net export position of each country would 
change little because extra-EU trade is comparatively small. Thus, when all EU countries pursue 
“beggar thy neighbour” policies through wage suppression, the international competitiveness 
effects will be minor, while the domestic effects will be decisive.   
Canada, Australia, China, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, and India are profit-led. As 
small open economies with a high share of exports and imports in national income, the net export 
effects are higher in all of these countries.   The effects discussed are only the national effects in 
isolation, i.e. assuming that the change is taking place only in one single country. The last column 
of Table A.1 summarises the total effects, when there is a global race to the bottom - a simultaneous 
1% decrease in the wage share in all of these large developed and developing countries. Comparing 
columns E and F, the contraction in the UK, as well as other wage-led countries (Eurozone-12, 
US, Japan, Turkey, and Korea) is now much higher. In this global race to the bottom scenario, a 
                                                          
5 Consistent with our findings, previous findings for the individual countries in the literature also mostly conclude that 
domestic demand is wage-led. See Stockhammer et al (2009) for the Euro area; Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011) for 
Germany, France, US, Japan, Canada, Australia; Naastepad and Storm (2007) for Germany, France, Italy, UK; Hein 
and Vogel (2008) for Germany, France, UK, US; Bowles and Boyer (1995) for Germany, France, UK, US, Japan; 
Stockhammer et al (2011) for Germany, and Ederer and Stockhammer (2007) for France. 
1%-point simultaneous decrease in the wage share leads to a decline in the Eurozone-12 by 0.25% 
point of GDP. The effect now is economically far more important.     
The profit-led economies of Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and India also begin to contract, 
when the effects of decreasing import prices and changes in the GDP of the trade partners on net 
exports are incorporated in a simultaneous race to the bottom scenario. These economies could 
still grow when they experience a fall in the wage-share alone, but when the wage share falls for 
all their trade partners, the expansionary effect of falling wage shares is reversed, as relative 
competitiveness effects are reduced and global demand contracts, when all countries are 
implementing a similar wage competition strategy.     
A 1%-point simultaneous decline in the wage share in the world leads to a decline in the 
global GDP by 0.36%-points (the average of the growth rates in column F of Table A.1 weighted 
by the share of each country in the world GDP). This leads to the conclusion that the world 
economy in aggregate is wage-led; if there is a simultaneous decline in the wage share in all 
countries (or as in our case in the thirteen major economies of the world), global aggregate demand 
also decreases. To reformulate the results positively, a 1%-point simultaneous increase in the wage 
share at the global level could lead to 0.36%-point higher rate of growth in the global GDP.   
To summarise, firstly, domestic private demand (the sum of consumption and investment) 
is wage-led in all countries, because consumption is much more sensitive to an increase in the 
profit share than investment is. Thus, an economy is profit-led only when the effect of distribution 
on net exports is high enough to offset the effects on domestic demand. Secondly, foreign trade 
forms only a small part of aggregate demand in large countries, like the Eurozone, UK, US, Japan, 
and therefore the positive effects of a decline in the wage share on net exports do not suffice to 
offset the negative effects on domestic demand. Similarly, if countries, which have strong trade 
relations with each other (like within the EU), are considered as an aggregate economic area, the 
private demand regime is wage-led. Thirdly, even if there are some countries, which are profit-led, 
the global economy as a whole is wage-led because the world is a closed economy. Mainstream 
strategies that impose the same wage moderation policies in all countries, assume that the world 
as a whole, as well as the majority of countries, are profit-led. This is against the logic of our 
findings, given that the effects of a fall in the wage share on domestic consumption more than 
offsets the effects on investment. 
The micro rationale of an individual firm cannot be generalised to the macro rationale of a 
country. Individual firms might prefer to reduce the labour costs of their own workers to increase 
profits (ignoring the effects of this on productivity and morale), but they would prefer all other 
firms to give a pay raise, so that there is someone to buy their goods. Even though a higher profit 
share at the firm level seems to be beneficial to individual employers, at the macroeconomic level 
a generalised fall in the wage share generates a problem of realisation of profits due to deficient 
demand in a wage-led economy. Furthermore, even in profit-led countries, a global fall in the wage 
share leads to a global aggregate demand deficiency, and potentially contraction in the profit-led 
countries as well. A seemingly rational pro-profit strategy at the level of an individual firm or a 
country is hence contractionary and counter-productive at the macro or global level.  
 [10] 
 
Table A1. The summary of the effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share (1%-point decrease in the wage share) 
 
 The effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share in only one country on The effect of a 
simultaneous 1%-
point increase in 
the profit share on 
% change in 
aggregate demand   Consumption/GDP Investment/GDP 
Net 
exports/GDP 
Initial change in private 
demand/GDP 
% change in aggregate 
demand (D*multiplier) 
 A B C D (A+B+C) E F 
Euro area-12 -0.439 0.299 0.057 -0.084 -0.133 -0.245 
Germany -0.501 0.376 0.096 -0.029 -0.031 - 
France -0.305 0.088 0.198 -0.020 -0.027 - 
Italy -0.356 0.130 0.126 -0.100 -0.173 - 
United Kingdom -0.303 0.120 0.158 -0.025 -0.030 -0.214 
United States -0.426 0.000 0.037 -0.388 -0.808 -0.921 
Japan -0.353 0.284 0.055 -0.014 -0.034 -0.179 
Canada -0.326 0.182 0.266 0.122 0.148 -0.269 
Australia -0.256 0.174 0.272 0.190 0.268 0.172 
Turkey -0.491 0.000 0.283 -0.208 -0.459 -0.717 
Mexico -0.438 0.153 0.381 0.096 0.106 -0.111 
Korea -0.422 0.000 0.359 -0.063 -0.115 -0.864 
Argentina -0.153 0.015 0.192 0.054 0.075 -0.103 
China -0.412 0.000 1.986 1.574 1.932 1.115 
India -0.291 0.000 0.310 0.018 0.040 -0.027 
South Africa -0.145 0.129 0.506 0.490 0.729 0.390 
Memo item: % change in GDP in G20 (average of Column F weighted by the share of each country in G20 GDP) -0.36 
 
Source: Onaran and Galanis (2012),  Is aggregate demand wage-led or profit-led? National and global effects, ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 31, 
Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_192121.pdf 
Note: The global simulation excludes Germany, France and Italy since they are part of the Eurozone
 [11] 
 
 
